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NOTES
ATTEMPTED BURGLARY AS A "VIOLENT FELONY"
UNDER THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT: AVOIDING
A "SERIOUS POTENTIAL RISK" OF CONFUSION IN THE
WAKE OF TAYLOR V. UNITED STATES, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)
The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 ("ACCA" or "the Act")1 is one
example of how Congress has attempted to combat crime by toughening
federal sentencing policies.2 Congress enacted the ACCA to augment state
law enforcement efforts against career criminals by increasing the
mandatory minimum sentence for a felon in possession of a firearm
conviction to fifteen years if the defendant has three predicate "violent
felony" convictions?
Under the ACCA, the term "violent felony" is defined, in relevant part,
as any crime that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another; or is burglary, arson,
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."4 Courts
have wrestled with the interpretation of this language since the Act's
passage. The final catchall provision, which addresses any "conduct
[involving] ... serious potential risk" to others ("otherwise clause" or
"catchall"), has been a source of confusion and controversy among lower
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2185 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988)).
2. The most recent example of such legislation is the "Three Strikes and You're Out" amendment
to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (1985), amended by Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. This legislation mandates life
imprisonment for a criminal with three "serious violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses." Id.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988).
4. Id. The full text of § 924(e)(2)(B) is as follows:
[T]he term "violent felony" means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a
firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term
if committed by an adult, that-
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another, or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (1988).
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courts, particularly when the crime of attempted burglary is involved.'
Attempted burglary is particularly difficult to analyze under the statutory
language of the ACCA because it does not necessarily involve the use
(either actual, attempted or threatened) of force against another person and
because Congress did not specifically include it as a predicate offense in
the language of the Act.6 Thus, if a sentencing court uses a defendant's
prior attempted burglary conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement,
it must consider the offense one that "otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."7 However,
attempted burglaries can involve a wide variety of conduct, only some of
which create a "serious potential risk" that a person will be injured. In the
absence of congressional guidance as to which crimes should fall within the
catchall,' judges have experienced difficulty interpreting the provision's
ambiguous language.' Consequently, federal district and appellate courts
have disagreed on when or whether a previous attempted burglary
conviction comes under the amorphous umbrella of the otherwise clause.'
In 1990, the Supreme Court provided a flicker of illumination on this
issue in Taylor v. United States." The Taylor decision did not, however,
focus on the language of the otherwise clause. Rather, it concentrated on
the definition and treatment of burglary as it appears in the language
preceding the otherwise clause.' Nonetheless, virtually every court that
has faced the attempted burglary question under the ACCA has turned to
Taylor for guidance, presumably because Taylor is the only Supreme Court
5. Some circuits have held that attempted burglary is not a "violent felony" for purposes of the
ACCA, while others have held the opposite. For a discussion of the circuit split, see infra notes 82-145
and accompanying text.
6. Although § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) specifically lists, among other crimes, "burglary" as a predicate
offense, courts agree that "burglary" does not include attempted burglary for purposes of the ACCA.
See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 2 F.3d 79, 80 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that attempted burglary "does
not contain the elements required for 'burglary' as that term is used in § 924(e)").
7. See supra note 4.
8. For a discussion of the ACCA's legislative history, see infra notes 21-43 and accompanying
text.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1010 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the
manner in which § 924(e) is to be construed is not readily apparent); United States v. Headspeth, 852
F.2d 753, 758 (4th Cir. 1988) (indicating that the catchall language is ambiguous). For a discussion of
these cases, see infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the circuit split, see infra notes 82-145 and accompanying text.
11. 495 U.S. 575 (1990). In Taylor, the Supreme Court explained that Congress included burglary
as a specifically enumerated offense under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) because it involved an inherent risk of
injury to people who might interrupt a burglar during the commission of the offense. Id. at 587-88.
12. For a discussion of Taylor, see infra notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
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decision that purports to interpret the language of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), and
because attempted burglary is similar in nature to burglary.13
According to Taylor, when a sentencing court determines whether a prior
burglary offense can be counted as a "violent felony" under
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), it may only look to the statutory elements of the prior
offense, and not to the facts underlying the conviction. 14 However,
because the elements of state attempt statutes are vague and substantially
similar to one another," district courts have encountered difficulties when
applying this "categorical approach" to prior attempted burglary offenses.
Thus, sentencing courts often turn to state attempt case law 6 to determine
whether a defendant's prior attempted burglary necessarily involved
elements that presented a potential risk of injury to others. 7
When courts employ the categorical approach and analyze the crime of
attempted burglary under state attempt case law, they often reach anoma-
lous and unfair results. In some jurisdictions, a defendant may receive an
13. Several appellate courts have concluded that attempted burglary and burglary pose almost the
same risk of injury to others due to the possibility that a property owner may return while the attempt
is in progress, or that a neighbor or law enforcement official may interrupt the offender in the course
of the crime. For a discussion of cases holding that both attempted burglary and burglary pose the same
risk of injury, see supra notes 84-125 and accompanying text.
14. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. Taylor recognized that the "Courts of Appeals uniformly have held
that § 924(e) mandates a formal categorical approach" and agreed with the reasoning of these courts.
Id. at 600. See also United States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1006-10 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Vidaure, 861 F.2d 1337, 1340 (5th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1088 (1989); United States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 758-59 (4th
Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the "categorical approach," see supra notes 53-57, 75-81 and
accompanying text.
15. The Model Penal Code ("MPC") states that one is guilty of attempt if one "purposely does or
omits to do anything that, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission
constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the
crime." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(l)(c) (1985). The MPC adds the caveat that the conduct must be
"strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose." Id. § 5.01(2). States that do not expressly adopt
the MPC definition of attempt often use similar language. For a discussion of the MPC definition of
attempt and its use by the majority of states, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. SCOTr, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW 508-09 (2d ed. 1986). See also Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J.
ON LEIS. 1, 15-16 (1989).
16. Statutory attempt language, such as "substantial step," has little practical meaning until courts
interpret such language in the context of the actual offense. Thus, although state attempt language is
similar, the meanings that courts impose upon the language are often very different. Compare People
v. Peters, 371 N.E.2d 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (holding defendant not guilty of attempted burglary
because there was no evidence that he actually attempted to enter a building) with State v. Vermillion,
832 P.2d 95 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (convicting defendant of attempted burglary for casing
neighborhood, selecting house to burgle, and possessing neckties to be used in burglary).
17. See infra notes 104-25 and accompanying text.
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enhanced sentence for a prior attempted burglary conviction that did not
involve a "serious potential risk of physical injury" to others."8 In other
jurisdictions, a defendant may avoid an enhanced sentence for a prior
attempted burglary conviction that clearly involved such a risk. 9 Such
inconsistent interpretations subject defendants to arbitrary adjudications,
undermining a goal of the Supreme Court-that similary-situated defen-
dants recieve uniform treatment-depending on how a particular court
chooses to apply Taylor to analysis of attempted burglary."
This Note offers a judicial solution that would allow courts to fairly and
uniformly analyze the issue of attempted burglary under the catchall
provision of the ACCA. Part I reviews the ACCA's legislative history. Part
II describes early attempts by federal appellate courts to interpret the
otherwise clause and the Supreme Court's treatment of the term "burglary"
as enumerated in the language immediately preceding the clause. Part III
examines the conflict among the circuits over how to approach the
attempted burglary question. Finally, Part IV proposes a generic attempted
burglary statute that would give each circuit a categorical framework for
analyzing attempted burglaries under the ACCA.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress originally enacted the ACCA in 1984. The Act addressed
Congress' growing concern that a large number of violent crimes and thefts
were being committed by a very small percentage of repeat offenders and
18. Courts generally agree that merely possessing burglary tools, casing a potential burglary site,
making duplicate keys, and similar conduct do not pose the same risk of injury as an actual physical
attempt to enter a building or structure. See, e.g., United States v. Weekley, 24 F.3d 1125, 1127 (9th
Cir. 1994) (recognizing that an attempted burglary conviction based on casing a home or possessing
burglary tools would not involve the kind of risk-creating conduct with which Congress was concerned).
Some courts have misconstrued the categorical approach to mean that because most attempted
burglaries involve potentially risky conduct, all attempted burglaries may be used for purposes of
sentence enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1992). See also Infra
notes 84-125 and accompanying text. This approach ignores the very real possibility that a prior
attempted burglary may have involved less than an actual physical entry or near entry into a building
or structure.
19. Some circuits have misinterpreted the categorical approach to mean that because some
attempted burglaries do not involve risky conduct, attempted burglaries cannot be used for purposes of
sentence enhancement. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 126-40 and accompanying text.
In those circuits, a defendant may escape an enhanced sentence for a prior attempted burglary that
involved actual physical entry or near entry into a building or structure.
20. United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 590-92 (1990).
21. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2185 (1984), repealed by
Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat. 458 (1986).
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that robbery and burglary were the crimes most frequently committed by
these criminals. 22 Under the original version of the Act, any convicted
felon found guilty of possession of a firearm who had three previous
convictions for either robbery or burglary received a mandatory minimum
fifteen year sentence.23
In 1986, the ACCA was recodified under the Firearms Owners'
Protection Act.24 Five months after the 1986 recodification, Congress
amended the ACCA to its current form.25 Prior to the Act's final enact-
ment, however, members of Congress vigorously debated the definition of
"violent felony." The opposing factions introduced two rival bills with
different definitions that varied in scope. 26
The first bill,27 which was introduced in both the Senate and the House,
omitted the words "robbery or burglary" from the original version and
instead provided that any "crime of violence" would count as one of the
three predicate convictions required for sentence enhancement.2' The bill
defined "crime of violence" as "an offense that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another," or any felony "which, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another
may be used in the course of committing the offense." 29 The proponents
22. H.R. REP. No. 98-1073, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1, 3 (1984). See also S. REP. No. 98-190,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983).
23. The Senate Report stated that burglary was included because it is one of "the most common
violent street crimes" and "[w]hile burglary is sometimes viewed as a non-violent crime, its character
can change rapidly, depending on the fortuitous presence of the occupants of the home when the burglar
enters, or their arrival while he is still on the premises." S. REP. No. 98-190, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 4-5
(1983).
24. Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat. 458 (1986)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)). The 1986 Act included minor amendments to the 1984 text of the
ACCA. Congress amended the definition of burglary by replacing the words "any felony" with "any
crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year." Id.
25. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-39 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)).
26. Compare S. 2312, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) and H.R. 4639, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)
with H.R. 4768, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). For a discussion of the opposing bills, see infra notes 26-
41 and accompanying text.
27. S. 2312, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 4639, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). This bill was
introduced in the Senate by Senator Specter and in the House by Representative Wyden. See S. 2312,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 4639, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
28. S. 2312, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 4639, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
29. S. 2312, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (emphasis added); H.R. 4639, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986) (emphasis added). It should be noted that this language is, with the exception of the words "or
property," identical to the language that defines "serious violent felonies" in the "Three Strikes and
You're Out" provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. See 18 U.S.C.
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of this bill hoped to broaden the Act's scope.3°
The drafters of the opposing bill3M sought to narrow the Act's scope by
limiting the crimes that would count towards sentence enhancement. Like
the first bill, the opposing bill struck the terms "robbery or burglary" from
the original version, instead adding the term "violent felony. '32 "Violent
felony" included only state and federal felonies that have as an element the
"use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
of another."33 Supporters of the first, more expansive bill criticized this
proposal for its failure to include burglary, arson, and other violent crimes
against property.34 Although these crimes did not have the actual or
threatened use of force against the person as an element, the supporters of
the first bill argued that they were crimes which, by their nature, posed a
severe and inherent danger to human life.
35
Congress ultimately drafted an amendment that struck a compromise
between the opposing bills.36 Both factions agreed that the definition of
"violent felony" should include crimes that have the actual, attempted or
§ 3559 (1985), amended by Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
30. When Senator Specter introduced Senate Bill 2312, he stated that since the enhancement
provision had thus far been "successful with the basic classification of robberies and burglaries as the
definition for 'career criminal,' the time has come to broaden that definition so that we may have a
greater sweep and more effective use of this important statute." 132 CONG. REC. 7697 (1986) (statement
of Sen. Specter).
31. H.R. 4768, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). This bill was introduced by Representatives Hughes
and McCollum.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 4639 and H.R. 4768 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 23-24 (1986) (statement of Rep. Wyden); Id. at 23-24
(statement of James Knapp, Deputy Ass't Attorney General, Crim. Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice).
35. Id.
36. H.R. 4885 was favorably reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. REp. No.
99-849, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The draft of the compromise bill, H.R. 4885, included "violent
felony" as a predicate offense, and provided that:
The term "violent felony" means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year that-
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another, or
(ii) involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
H.R. REP. No. 99-849, at 7.
The Subcommittee on Crime agreed that part (ii) of this draft would:
[A]dd State and Federal crimes against property such as burglary, arson, extortion, use of
explosives, and similar crimes as predicate offenses where the conduct involved presents a
serious risk of injury to a person.
Id. at 3.
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threatened use of force against others as an element of the offense.37
Congress also broadened the scope of the term "violent felony" by
including the catchall provision.3" However, the catchall did not include
crimes that, by their "very nature," involved a "substantial risk" of physical
force against the "person or property" of others.39 Rather, only crimes that
presented a "serious potential risk" of physical injury to "another [person]"
were included.4" Moreover, the amendment, as finally enacted, specifically
enumerated burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives as part of
the definition of "violent felony" in § 924(e).4'
Attempt crimes have never been specifically designated as predicate
offenses under any version of the ACCA.4" Moreover, the legislative
history is virtually silent on the issue of whether Congress envisioned
attempt crimes, particularly attempted burglary, to fall under the catchall
37. This provision is consistent with the language of the second bill, H.R. 4768. See supra text
accompanying notes 31 and 32.
38. See supra note 4 for the language of the catchall provision.
39. One of the proposed bills included in the definition of "crime[s] of violence" any felony
"which, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense." See supra note 29 and accompanying
text. Prior to Taylor, two federal appellate decisions held that the final form of the catchall really refers
to crimes which, by their nature, create a risk of harm to others. For a discussion of these cases, see
infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
40. For the full text of the current version of the ACCA's definition of "violent felony," see supra
note 4.
41. The provision that was finally enacted included the language, "is burglary, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives, or othenrise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (1988) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court concluded that the compromise bill, H.R. 4885, implicitly considered burglary
and the other offenses enumerated in the final version of the bill as offenses that "involve[] conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575,
587 (1990). The last-minute addition of the enumerated offenses "seemingly was meant simply to make
explicit the provision's implied coverage of crimes such as burglary." Id. at 589.
42. There are, however, other federal sentencing instruments that specifically include attempt
crimes for purposes of sentence enhancement. For example, the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("USSG") define "crime of violence" using almost the exact same language the ACCA uses to define
"violent felony":
[A]ny offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year that-
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another, or
(ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES [U.S.S.G.] § 4B1.2(l) (1995). Application Note One to the
guidelines states that the term "crime of violence" includes attempts to commit the offenses enumerated
in the guidelines. Id. § 4B1.2 n.1.
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provision. 3 Although Congress failed to offer any specific examples of
offenses that might be covered by the otherwise clause in § 924(e), the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits have attempted to answer this question.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)
A. Circuit court decisions addressing the language of the otherwise
clause before Taylor.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor, at least two circuits
confronted the issue of what crimes Congress intended the otherwise clause
in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) to encompass. Although those courts did not analyze
attempted burglary under the ACCA, they attempted to define the scope of
the otherwise clause for purposes of other crimes not expressly listed in
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
In United States v. Headspeth," the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed whether the crime of storehouse breaking" was an "otherwise"
offense.46 The court noted that the "otherwise" clause was ambiguous47
and elucidated two possible interpretations of the provision.4" First, the
court stated, one could interpret the otherwise clause to refer to only
offenses which, "by their very nature," present a risk of injury to the
person.49 Or, the court continued, one could read this language as referring
43. See 130 CONG. REc. 3100 (1984). However, Senate Bill 52, which was never enacted,
specifically enumerated predicate offenses for sentence enhancement as "any robbery or burglary
offense, or a conspiracy or attempt to commit such an offense .... Id.
44. 852 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1988).
45. Under Maryland law, the offense of "storehouse breaking" is defined as:
[B]reaking [into] a storehouse, filling station, garage, trailer, cabin, diner, warehouse or other
outhouse or into a boat in the day or night with an intent to commit murder or felony therein,
or with the intent to steal, take or carry away the personal goods of another of the value of
$300 or more therefrom ....
Id. at 756 (citing MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 32 (1987)).
46. Headspeth, 852 F.2d at 758-59. Because this case was decided before Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575 (1990), the Fourth Circuit did not have the benefit of Taylor's analysis of the term
"burglary." Id. at 599. The court therefore concluded that the definition of "burglary" did not include
the offense of storehouse breaking and analyzed storehouse breaking under the otherwise clause. 852
F.2d at 758-59. Although Taylor, in effect, overruled Headspeth, Headspeth remains relevant in light
of the Fourth Circuit's attempt to interpret the meaning and application of the otherwise clause. Id.
47. Id. at 758.
48. Id. at 758-59.
49. Id. at 758. The court noted that this was the language proposed by the drafters of H.R. 4639,
the more inclusive of the two proposals that eventually resulted in the current provision in § 924(e). Id.
For a discussion of H.R. 4639 and its companion bill in the Senate, S. 2312, see supra notes 27-30 and
accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that this interpretation may be the most plausible,
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to crimes that, under the facts and circumstances of their commission,
actually posed such a risk." Whether the crime, in its generic sense,
posed an inherent risk to an individual was irrelevant. The court concluded
that the rule of lenity required the court to adopt the narrower interpretation
of the statutory language." Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that the other-
wise clause is limited to offenses that, "as defined, pose by their very
nature a serious potential risk of injury to another."52
In United States v. Sherbondy,"3 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the otherwise clause,54
but took its interpretation one step further. The Ninth Circuit decided, based
on the legislative history of § 924(e) and the extreme practical difficulties
associated with conducting "ad hoc mini-trials" to determine the nature of
prior offenses,55 that the otherwise clause is a "generalized version of the
because the specifically enumerated crimes preceding the catchall (burglary, arson, extortion, and use
of explosives) are all offenses that "by their very nature obviously pose an inherent risk of injury to the
person." Headspeth, 852 F.2d at 758. Based on this view of the otherwise clause, storehouse breaking
is not a violent felony. It does not inherently involve a risk of injury to people because the crime, by
its very nature, involves unoccupied buildings. Id.
50. Id. The court based its interpretation on the fact that the statute in its current form does not
contain the limiting language, "by its nature." Id. Thus, one can interpret the language as including any
crime that actually involves risky behavior. Under this interpretation of the otherwise clause, the specific
storehouse breaking at issue constituted a violent felony because the defendant heaved a brick through
the plate glass window of a jewelry store. Id.
51. The court acknowledged that since "the legislative history and other extrinsic sources offer no
guidance in resolving the ambiguity [of the otherwise clause] .... the rule of lenity required that the
ambiguity be resolved in favor of the accused. Headspeth, 852 F.2d at 759.
The rule of lenity is a "well-established principle of statutory construction" which requires that
"ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of lenity for the accused." Id. (citing United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) and Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)). The
court continued to explain that the policy of lenity "means that the [Supreme] Court will not interpret
a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an
interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended." Id. (citing Ladner
v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)).
52. Id. at 758-59. The court determined that the crime of "storehouse breaking" was not a crime
that "by its very nature" posed an inherent risk of injury to the person because it generally involves
unoccupied buildings. Id. at 758.
53. 865 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1988). The Sherbondy court specifically addressed the issue of whether
a prior conviction for witness intimidation constituted a violent felony under the otherwise clause of
§ 924(e). Id. at 1005.
54. Id. at 1006.
55. Id. at 1008. The court elaborated upon the practical problems that accompany such factual
inquiries:
Witnesses would often be describing events years past. Such testimony is highly unreliable
.... [T]he witnesses might be persons who did not even testify at the earlier criminal
proceeding. In many cases, witnesses to the events in question might be unavailable
altogether. Additionally, there would likely be substantial problems with court records and
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categorical approach."56 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, Congress
intended the otherwise clause to reach other statutory and common-law
offenses that inherently involve a similar serious risk of harm but are not
covered by § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) 7
The court provided two examples of crimes that, according to its
analysis, would constitute "otherwise" offenses-manslaughter and
kidnapping." The court explained that although manslaughter does not
include physical force as a categorical element of the offense, it is still a
crime that "by its nature" involves the death of another person and is
transcripts relating to earlier convictions. These problems become especially difficult...
where, because the conviction was based on a guilty plea, there is little or no contemporane-
ous record developed.
Id.
The court also recognized that there may be an "intermediate approach" to factual inquiries under
the statute. Id. at 1008 n.16. Under this approach, a sentencing court should only look to the "court
records of prior convictions." Id. The court explicitly noted that a court should not "limit [its] analysis
to the category of offense committed [] or conduct a full hearing into the individual facts of the
defendant .... " Id. The Sherbondy court also illustrated the substantial evidentiary problems that
accompany what it dubbed the "intermediate approach":
The record would still be deficient in those cases where convictions were the result of guilty
pleas. Individual judges would have to determine whether to consider the more subjective
portions of the record, including pre-sentence and probationary reports and the comments and
opinions of the trial judge.
Id.
The Sherbondy court refused to adopt the "intermediate approach" because of practical difficulties
and apparent lack of congressional intent. Id. However, the Supreme Court overlooked the potential
flaws of the "intermediate approach" and adopted a substantially similar approach two years later in
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (holding that a court can look to the indictment or
information and jury instructions to determine what elements of the offense the defendant was charged
with and what the jury necessarily had to find in order to convict). For a further discussion of the
Taylor decision and the "categorical approach," see infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
56. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d at 1008. The court observed that "Congress consistently discussed
subsection (ii) in categorical terms .... Id. The court concluded:
[T]he "otherwise" clause [is not] an indication by Congress of its intention to abandon the
categorical approach it uses throughout the section in favor of one that requires courts to
examine individual acts in the case of the unspecified offenses; rather we construe it as an
attempt to set forth a general description that serves to expand the intended categories beyond
the four explicitly listed.
Id.
The court found it unlikely that Congress would, in the absence of express language in the Act,
authorize "ad hoc mini-trials" to determine the specific conduct involved in an individual's prior
offense. Id. at 1008.
57. Id. at 1009. For the language of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), see supra note 4.
58. Id. The court explained that kidnapping and involuntary manslaughter do not have the use of
force, either actual, attempted or threatened, as an element of the offense, Id. Thus, they are not
specifically enumerated in the first part of subsection (ii), but "are covered by the final clause of
subsection (ii)." Id.
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"highly likely to be the result of violence."5 9 Likewise, violence is not
necessarily an element of kidnapping, but the court concluded that because
the offense entails a "'serious potential risk of physical injury' to the
victim," it is a "violent felony" under subsection (ii).6" Based on the above
analysis and examples, it is not likely that the Sherbondy court would
consider attempted burglary a crime that "by its nature" presents a serious
risk of injury to another person.
B. Taylor's interpretation of "burglary" and its categorical approach
to § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)
The Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Taylor v. United States" is
critical to the circuits' analysis of whether attempted burglary is a "violent
felony" under the ACCA. In Taylor, the Court defined and explained the
term "burglary" as it appears in the first part of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).6' Since
Taylor, the question of whether attempted burglary constitutes an
"otherwise" violent felony has appeared in almost every federal appellate
court.63 As the only Supreme Court decision that interprets the language
of § 924(e)(2)(B), Taylor has proven to be a tempting tool for lower courts
attempting to analogize between the closely related crimes of burglary and
attempted burglary.
In Taylor, the defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon.' At the time of his plea, the defendant had
four prior convictions, two of which were for second degree burglary under
Missouri law. 5 Pursuant to the ACCA, the district court judge imposed
upon Taylor a fifteen year minimum sentence enhancement.66 Taylor
appealed, arguing that his burglary convictions should not count for
purposes of sentence enhancement because they did not involve "conduct
59. 865 F.2d at 1009.
60. Id.
61. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
62. Id. The first part of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) specifically includes the offenses of burglary, arson,
kidnapping, and the use of explosives in the definition of"violent felony." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)
(Supp. 1994). For the full text of § 924(e)(2)(B), see supra note 4.
63. Before Taylor, no federal appellate court had addressed the question of whether attempted
burglary was a violent felony under the ACCA. Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds database for cases
before 1990 (Mar. 3, 1995). This fact seems to imply that Taylor expanded the reach of § 924(e) by
giving prosecutors and sentencing courts a way to include attempted burglary as a predicate offense for
purposes of sentence enhancement.
64. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 579.
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that present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" under
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).67  The Eighth Circuit affirmed Taylor's enhanced
sentence and held that because the term "burglary" in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)
"means 'burglary' however a state chooses to define it," the district court
was correct in using Taylor's second degree burglary convictions to
enhance his sentence.68 Thus, the Supreme Court granted certiorari69 to
decide what Congress meant by the term "burglary," as specifically
enumerated in § 924(e)'s definition of "violent felony."7
The Court recognized that Congress included burglary as an enumerated
offense under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) because it inherently posed a serious
potential risk of physical harm to others.7 According to the Court, this
inherent danger arises from the likelihood that people will either be present
in the building or structure when the burglar enters or will arrive on the
scene while the burglar is still on the premises.72 The Court stated that
"the offender's own awareness of this possibility may mean that he is
prepared to use violence if necessary to carry out his plans or to es-
cape."'73 Therefore, the Court concluded that "burglary" ought to be
defined in generic terms, "having the basic elements of unlawful or
unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent
to commit a crime."'74
67. 495 U.S. at 579.
68. Id.
69. 493 U.S. 889 (1989).
70. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 579-80. The Court granted certiorari specifically to "resolve a conflict
among the Courts of Appeals concerning the definition of burglary for purposes of § 924(e)." Id. The
circuit courts were divided on the question of whether Congress meant the term "burglary" in
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) to be defined according to the common-law definition of burglary, how an individual
state labeled its statute, or a generic definition based on that in the MPC. Id. at 580. The common law
defines burglary as "a breaking and entering of a dwelling at night with the intent to commit a felony."
Id. at 592. The generic definition of burglary is defined as "having the basic elements of unlawful or
unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime." Id. at
599.
71. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588.
72. Id. at 581.
73. Id. at 588. This section of the Taylor opinion had a profound impact on many of the
subsequent cases dealing with attempted burglary. Several circuits have reasoned that attempted burglary
is an "otherwise" offense because it poses the same inherent risk of harm as burglary-that the
attempted burglar will employ violent means to complete the offense or to escape capture. For a
discussion of these cases, see infra notes 84-125 and accompanying text.
74. Id. The Court based its conclusion on the legislative history and congressional intent behind
§ 924(e)(2)(B). Id. at 581-90. The generic definition of burglary was originally included in the 1984
draft of the ACCA. Id. at 598. The definition was omitted in subsequent drafts and was not replaced
with a different or narrower one. Id. Moreover, no alternative definition was ever discussed. There is
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss4/5
1995] ATTEMPTED BURGLARY UNDER THE ACCA 1661
The Court also adopted the "categorical approach" and held that
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) generally requires the sentencing court to look only to the
statutory definitions of the prior offense the defendant was convicted of,
and not to the underlying facts of those convictions.7" The Court reached
some indication in the Act's legislative history that the exclusion of the burglary definition was
inadvertent. Id. at 598-99. The Court decided that "there simply is no plausible alternative that Congress
could have had in mind." Id.
The generic burglary definition adopted by the Court in Taylor is substantially identical to that
adopted by the drafters of the MPC. Under the MPC, "[a] person is guilty of burglary if he enters a
building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to
commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed
or privileged to enter." MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (1980).
75. Id. at 600. The Court decided that "the only plausible interpretation of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
that, like the rest of the enhancement statute, it generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact
of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense." Id. at 601. Because the Court specifically
referred to § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and the last phrase of this section includes the otherwise clause, courts that
have analyzed the attempted burglary question under the otherwise clause often interpret Taylor as
explicitly holding that the otherwise clause is confined to a categorical analysis. See, e.g., United States
v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1363 (4th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has made it clear
that uniform sentencing under § 924(e) requires a categorical approach).
However, it is not at all clear that the Court intended to impose the categorical approach upon the
otherwise clause. The Court granted certiorari in Taylor to determine the meaning of burglary, not to
interpret the meaning and scope of the otherwise clause. Id. at 579-80. In fact, the very first sentence
of the Court's opinion announces, "[i]n this case we are called upon to determine the meaning of the
word 'burglary' as it is used in ... § 924(e)." Id. at 577. Moreover, the text of the Taylor opinion
strongly suggests that the Court would not (or could not) analyze all "catchall" crimes categorically.
The Court noted in a footnote that its concern was "only to determine what offenses should count as
'burglaries' for enhancement purposes." Id. at 600 n.9. Immediately following this disclaimer, the Court
recognized that the government "remain[ed] free to argue that any offense-including offenses similar
to generic burglary-should count towards enhancement as one that 'otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."' Id. Only after setting forth this limiting
language did the Court concede that "§ 924(e) mandates a formal categorical approach." Id. at 600.
Because the Court explicitly divorces the otherwise clause from its analysis of the definition of
"burglary," it appears that the Court did not intend its holding to extend beyond the enumerated
predicate offenses listed in the first part of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how the Court could categorically analyze "any offense" under
the otherwise clause. For example, Taylor held that all generic burglaries pose an inherent risk of
physical injury to others. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. However, the Court considered
other burglaries, such as the burglary of an automobile or a vending machine, beyond the scope of the
term "burglary" (and presumably not inherently risk-creating). Id. at 599. Thus, in order to include a
broader type of burglary as a prior predicate offense for sentence enhancement, courts must seek refuge
in the otherwise clause. According to the Supreme Court, however, only burglaries that have the basic
elements of unlawful entry into a building or other structure with the intent to commit a crime
inherently pose a risk of harm to others. According to Taylor, a non-generic burglary such as the
burglary of a vending machine does not categorically set forth elements that would inherently pose a
potential risk of harm to others. Thus, the only way to determine whether a non-generic burglary, such
as the burglary of a vending machine, involved risk-creating conduct would be to examine, in some
fashion, the facts surrounding the individual occurrence.
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this conclusion by looking to the statute's plain language 76 and legislative
history77 and by elaborating upon the practical difficulties and potential
unfairness inherent in fact-specific inquiries.7"
At least one circuit concluded that Taylor precludes district courts from conducting factual inquiries
only in situations where the offenses specifically enumerated in the first part of subsection (ii) are
concerned. United States v. John, 936 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1991). In John, the Third Circuit held that
district courts have discretion to consider the facts underlying predicate convictions when determining
whether a prior crime was a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2 of the USSG. Id. at 765, 770-71.
Because the USSG's definition of "crime of violence" is virtually identical to the ACCA's definition
of "violent felony," the Third Circuit relied on Taylor and explained that:
The sum and substance of Taylor is that for purposes of what we have called the first
prong-i.e., crimes specifically enumerated-the government may not attempt to prove by
reference to actual conduct that a prior conviction constitutes a "violent felony" when the
crime for which the defendant was convicted does not conform to the generic, common law
definition.
Id. at 769. John, however, involved the USSG, not the ACCA. No court that has analyzed attempted
burglary under the ACCA has ever ruled similarly.
76. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600. The Court observed that the language of§ 924(e) refers to offenders
who have three previous "convictions" for three prior violent felonies or drug offenses as opposed to
offenders who have "committed" three prior violent felonies or drug offenses. Id. (emphasis added).
Based on Congress' choice of words, the Court concluded that Congress "intended the sentencing court
to look only to the fact that the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories
and not to the facts underlying the prior convictions." Id. The Court also pointed out that
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) defines 'violent felony' as any crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a
year that 'has as an element'-not any crime that, in a particular case, involves-the use or threat of
force." Id. (emphasis added). The Court relied on this distinction to infer that "the phrase 'is burglary'
in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) most likely refers to the elements of the statute of conviction, not to the facts of
each defendant's conduct." Id. at 600-01.
77. Id. at 601. The Court stated that "[i]f Congress had meant to adopt an approach that would
require the sentencing court to engage in an elaborate fact finding process regarding the defendant's
prior offenses, surely this would have been mentioned somewhere in the legislative history." Id.
Moreover, the Court pointed out that in the 1984 version of the ACCA, "robbery" and "burglary" were
defined in the text of the statute. Id. at 588. Thus, "Congress intended that the enhancement provision
be triggered by crimes having certain specified elements, not by crimes that happened to be labeled
'robbery' or 'burglary' by the laws of the State of conviction." Id. at 588-89. For further discussion of
the legislative history of the ACCA, see supra notes 21-43.
78. Id. at 601. The Court noted that in some cases, "only the Government's actual proof at trial
would indicate whether the defendant's conduct constituted generic burglary." Id. In order to illustrate
the practical difficulties and potential unfairness that arise via the fact-finding approach, the Court raised
the following questions and issues:
Would the Government be permitted to introduce the trial transcript before the sentencing
court, or if no transcript is available, present the testimony of witnesses? Could the defense
present witnesses of its own and argue that the jury might have returned a guilty verdict on
some theory that did not require a finding that the defendant committed generic burglary? If
the sentencing court were to conclude, from its own review of the record, that the defendant
actually committed a generic burglary, could the defendant challenge this conclusion as
abridging his right to a jury trial? Also, in cases where the defendant pleaded guilty, there
often is no record of the underlying facts. Even if the Government were able to prove those
facts, ifa guilty plea to a lesser, nonburglary offense was the result ofa plea bargain, it would
seem unfair to impose a sentence enhancement as if the defendant had pleaded guilty to
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The Court further recognized that when a defendant has been convicted
under a state statute that is defined more broadly than the generic definition
of burglary,79 the government is not necessarily precluded from seeking
an enhanced sentence." The Court thus allows a sentencing court to go
beyond the mere fact of conviction and examine the indictment or
information and jury instructions to determine whether the defendant was
charged with and whether the jury had to find that the defendant's state law
crime of burglary met all the elements required for generic burglary.8'
IIl. MODERN DOCTRINE IN THE WAKE OF TAYLOR
Since the Supreme Court defined burglary as it appears in
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), the question of whether attempted burglary is a violent
felony under this section of the ACCA has arisen in almost every federal
appellate court.82 Given that there are no pre-Taylor cases dealing with
attempted burglary under the ACCA,"3 one could infer that prior to Taylor
most courts did not consider attempted burglary as a crime that Congress
envisioned within the ambit of the otherwise clause. Thus, although the
Supreme Court in Taylor purported only to define the term "burglary," it
essentially provided the means for prosecutors and sentencing courts to
broaden the scope of § 924(e). The following analysis reveals that the
circuits are divided and often misguided in their treatment and analysis of
this issue.
burglary.
Id. at 601-02. For a further discussion of the practical difficulties associated with "ad hoe mini-trials,"
see supra note 55.
79. The Court pointed out that some states' burglary statutes "define burglary more broadly, e.g.,
by eliminating the requirement that the entry be unlawful, or by including places, such as automobiles
and vending machines, other than buildings." 495 U.S. at 599.
80. Id. at 602. The Court wanted to ensure that district courts could still use the categorical
approach to reach prior burglary convictions that actually encompassed all the elements of generic
burglary but were obtained under state burglary statutes that were broader than the generic definition
of burglary.
81. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600. This approach strongly resembles the "intermediate approach"
described in United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1008 n.16 (9th Cir. 1988). Under the Sherbondy
court's definition of the "intermediate approach," a sentencing court would be allowed to examine the
"court records of prior convictions." Id. For a discussion of Sherbondy and the intermediate approach,
see supra note 55. Additionally, for a discussion of how courts have liberally construed this part of the
Taylor holding to mean that courts may look at many other documents besides charging papers and jury
instructions, see infra note 155.
82. The Eleventh Circuit is the only circuit that has not addressed this issue. Search of
WESTLAW, Allfeds database (Mar. 3, 1995).
83. Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds database (Mar. 3, 1995).
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A. Courts that have held that attempted burglary is a "violent felony"
under the ACCA
1. Attempted burglary is always a "violent felony" because it involves
the same potential risk of harm to others as burglary.
Some circuits have held that attempted burglary is always a violent
felony under the ACCA because it is a crime that usually involves the same
potential risk of injury to others as burglary. These circuits employ a strict
categorical approach and allow sentence enhancement if the state statute
defines attempted burglary as presenting the same risk of injury to others
as burglary. Whether the attempted burglary actually involves such risk-
creating conduct is irrelevant.
In United States v. Custis,84 the Fourth Circuit found no significant
difference between attempted burglaries and burglaries.8 5 In Custis, the
defendant argued that his prior attempted breaking and entering86 convic-
tion was not a "violent felony" because, under Maryland law, attempted
breaking and entering involves conduct such as lying in wait or reconnoi-
tering the location of the intended burglary site, neither of which presents
a risk of injury to others. Relying on Taylor, the court rejected this
assertion and stated that because the Supreme Court requires a "formal
categorical approach" when interpreting § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), a court may
look only to the statutory definition of the prior offenses and not to the
particular facts underlying those convictions.88 Under the statutory
definition of breaking and entering in Maryland, the crime's location must
be "a dwelling house of another."8 9 The court concluded that because such
a building is likely to be occupied, an attempt to illegally enter a dwelling
categorically meets Taylor's generic definition of burglary and necessarily
presents the same risk of injury to others as if the defendant were actually
inside the home.9"
84. 988 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1992), affd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994).
85. Id. at 1363-64.
86. For purposes of this analysis, there is no significant difference between attempted burglary and
attempted breaking and entering.
87. 988 F.2d at 1363.
88. Id.
89. Id. (construing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 31A (1987)).
90. Id. The court assumed that the defendant had attempted to illegally enter an occupied dwelling
but offered no proof that his attempt actually reached the requisite level of completion. Id. at 1364. See
also United States v. Payne, 966 F.2d 4 (Ist Cir. 1992). The Payne court explained that "the risk of
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The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue again in United States v.
Thomas.9' In Thomas, the New Jersey burglary statute used to convict the
defendant was broader than Taylor's generic definition of burglary92
because it included places such as cars, ships, and airplanes in its definition
of "structure."'93 According to Taylor's analysis, the extra elements in New
Jersey's statute required the court to look to the charging papers and jury
instructions to determine if a jury was required to find that the prior offense
actually involved a building or structure.94 However, the Fourth Circuit
failed to examine such documents and merely followed its decision in
Custis by holding that attempted burglary, as defined by New Jersey law,
qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA.9"
In Custis, the Fourth Circuit erroneously applied Taylor to the attempted
breaking and entering law at issue in that case. In Taylor, the Supreme
Court stated that the reason why burglary is an enumerated felony under
the ACCA is because of the likelihood that people will be present in a
building or structure when a burglar enters or will arrive on the scene when
the burglar is still engaged in the offense." The risk of harm inherent in
burglary is that "[t]he offender's own awareness of this possibility may
mean that he is prepared to use violence if necessary to carry out his plans
or to escape."97 The Fourth Circuit decided that because-the structure at
issue had to be a "dwelling house of another,"98 and people would
probably be present in such a dwelling, the attempted breaking and entering
injury arises, not from the completion of the break-in, but rather from the possibility that some innocent
party may appear on the scene while the break-in is occurring." Id. at 8. The court continued, stating:
"[This] possibility may be at its peak while the defendant is still outside trying to break in, as that is
when he is likely to be making noise and exposed to the public view." Id. See also United States v.
O'Brien, 972 F.2d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Payne, 966 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1992));
United States v. Fish, 928 F.2d 185, 187 (6th Cir. 1991).
91. 2 F.3d 79 (4th Cir. 1993).
92. Taylor held that "burglary" as defined by the ACCA means "an unlawful or unprivileged entry
into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime." Taylor, 495 U.S.
at 598. For a discussion of Taylor, see supra notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 18-1 (West 1982). Under New Jersey law, a person is guilty of burglary
if he enters a "structure" with the intent to commit an offense therein. Id. § 2C:18-2. A structure is
defined as "any building, room, ship, vessel, car, vehicle or airplane, and also means any place adapted
for overnight accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business therein, whether or not a person
is actually present." Id. § 2C:18-1.
94. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
95. Thomas, 2 F.3d at 80.
96. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 89.
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necessarily posed the same level of risk as the completed offense.99 This
reasoning ignores the fact that in some states, a defendant can be convicted
of attempted breaking and entering or attempted burglary for a variety of
actions, most of which fall short of actual physical attempts to enter a
building. In the state of Maryland, where the offense at issue in Custis
occurred, it is possible that the defendant was convicted of attempted
breaking and entering merely because he was casing a neighborhood or
"lying in wait."' 0 Because it is less likely that an attempted burglar will
employ violence to escape a premises he/she has never entered or has not
yet come close to entering, the Taylor "risk of harm" rationale would not
necessarily apply to attempted burglaries that involve something less than
an actual physical attempt to enter a building.'
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit took no steps to determine if the
defendant's prior attempted burglary conviction involved an actual attempt
to enter a dwelling. The court failed to examine the charging papers and
jury instructions to determine whether, in order to convict, the jury
necessarily had to find that the defendant was caught trying to illegally
enter a dwelling."t 2 The court also failed to examine state attempted
breaking and entering cases to determine whether a person could be
convicted of attempted breaking and entering in Maryland if the person
failed to physically attempt to enter a dwelling. Without making these
inquiries, it is impossible for the court to accurately assert that attempted
breaking and entering in Maryland truly presents the same potential risk of
harm as burglary.
99. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355. See also United States v. Lane, 909 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1990). In Lane,
the court held that even though the defendant failed to complete the attempted burglary, his actions still
posed a serious potential risk of harm to others. Id. at 903. The court examined Ohio's burglary law,
noting that burglary in that state requires that the burglarized structure be occupied. The court also
examined Ohio's attempt statute, which stated that to convict a defendant of an attempt, the defendant
must have intended to carry out the completed crime and engaged in conduct in furtherance of
committing the crime. Id. Thus, the court concluded, attempted burglary in Ohio possessed the same
potential for violent confrontation as burglary. Id. However, the court overlooked the fact that "conduct
toward the commission of that crime" could entail behavior that falls short of physical entry or near
entry into a building.
100. See supra note 87.
101. See infra note 146 and 147 and accompanying text.
102. The Supreme Court permits a court to examine the charging papers, jury instructions, and other
information when the state statute is broader than Taylor's generic definition of burglary. Taylor, 495
U.S. at 602. Because in many states a person may engage in conduct that does not qualify as an attempt
to actually illegally enter an occupied building, a court should be required to examine court documents
to determine whether the defendant's conviction actually involved attempted physical entry into an
occupied building.
(VOL. 73:1649
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The New Jersey burglary statute cited in Thomas was, in fact, broader
than the definition of generic burglary in Taylor. °3 Therefore, it is
possible that Thomas' prior attempted burglary conviction could have
involved a car or some other structure. Because the Supreme Court found
in Taylor that such burglaries do not pose a serious enough risk to others
to be considered burglary for purposes of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), an attempt at
such burglaries would likewise lack a serious potential risk of injury to
others. Thus, in the Fourth Circuit, a court may use a defendant's prior
attempted breaking and entering conviction for purposes of
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) sentence enhancement even though the prior offense may
not have involved an actual entry or near entry into a dwelling. Such an
offense, arguably, does not involve conduct that poses a serious potential
risk of injury to others.
2. Attempted burglary is a "violent felony" because state statutes and
case law illustrate that attempted burglary always involves conduct
that poses a risk of violent confrontation equal to completed
burglary.
In accordance with Taylor's mandate that courts must analyze
§ 924(e)(2)(b)(ii) crimes according to the statutory elements rather than the
underlying facts of the prior offense, some circuits look to state burglary
and attempt statutes, as well as case law concerning attempt crimes, to
determine if an attempted burglary posed a sufficiently similar risk of harm
as burglary and could therefore be considered a "violent felony." The
prevailing rationale behind this line of cases is that state attempt statutes or,
more specifically, the judicial interpretation of such statutes clearly indicate
that there is little difference between attempted burglary and burglary.
Thus, based on this rationale in the state of conviction, an attempted
burglary will necessarily always involve conduct that poses a serious
potential risk of physical injury to others. However, only the Seventh
Circuit convincingly employs state case law to support this assertion.
In United States v. Davis,"° the Seventh Circuit held that the
defendant's conviction for attempted burglary under Illinois law was a
"violent felony" under the ACCA.10 5 The court first examined the Illinois
attempt statute, which, like many others, requires the defendant to have the
103. See supra note 93.
104. 16 F.3d 212 (7th Cir. 1994).
105. Id. at 219.
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intent to commit the crime and to commit an act constituting a "substantial
step" towards the commission of the offense. 6 The court recognized that
because courts disagree about the meaning of the "substantial step"
language, the language of the attempt statute, standing alone, is of little
significance." 7 Thus, the court turned to Illinois case law to determine
how close to the completion of burglary a defendant must come to be
convicted of attempted burglary.' 8
The court determined that to be convicted of attempted burglary under
Illinois law, the defendant must come within "dangerous proximity to
success.""09 The court cited several Illinois cases which held that a
defendant must actually attempt to enter a building to be convicted of
attempted burglary." ' Thus, the court concluded that there is little
difference between the risk of violent confrontation in attempted burglary
and burglary."1
Using the same rationale set forth in Davis, other circuits have held that
attempted burglary is a "violent felony." However, case law in the states
of conviction fails to support the conclusion that attempted burglary is a
"violent felony" under the ACCA.
In United States v. Andrello,'" 2 the Second Circuit held that attempted
burglary is a "violent felony" because under New York law, a person can
only be convicted of attempted burglary if he engages in conduct that
comes within "dangerous proximity" to completion of the offense."'
However, a close examination of New York case law reveals that a
defendant need not have physically attempted to enter a structure to be
106. 16 F.3d at 217. The Illinois attempt law is similar to the one found in the MPC. Compare 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 518/4 (1994) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1985).
107. Davis, 16 F.3d at 217.
108. Id. at 218.
109. Id.
110. Id. In People v. Peters, a jury convicted the defendants of attempted burglary because they
were found crouching behind a garbage container with a ladder resting against the building beside them,
and someone inside the building had heard footsteps on the roof. 371 N.E.2d 156 (III. App. Ct. 1977).
However, the appellate court reversed the conviction because "there [was] no evidence whatsoever that
they actually made any attempt to enter the building." Id. at 157. In People v. Ray, the jury convicted
the defendant of attempted burglary because he was arrested behind a building carrying a crow bar,
holding a flashlight, and wearing gloves. 278 N.E.2d 170 (I11. App. Ct. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,
297 N.E.2d 168 (I11. 1973). Once again, the Illinois Court of Appeals reversed the conviction because
there was no evidence that the defendant had attempted to enter the building. Id. at 172-73.
111. Davis, 16 F.3d at 218.
112. 9 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 1993).
113. Id. at 249.
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convicted of attempted burglary. In People v. Sullivan,"4 the Court of
Appeals of New York held one defendant guilty of attempted burglary
merely because he possessed burglary tools and went to a building with the
intent to illegally enter it, despite the fact that he was frightened away
while inspecting the premises."' Thus, in the Second Circuit, it is
possible that a defendant could receive an enhanced sentence for past
attempted burglary convictions that did not, in fact, pose a serious potential
risk of physical injury to others.
Other courts have relied on unconvincing state attempt case law to
support a claim that there is no significant difference between attempted
and completed burglary. In United States v. Payne,"6 the First Circuit
held that a Massachusetts conviction for attempted breaking and entering
was a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA." 7 To be convicted of
attempted burglary in Massachusetts, a defendant must have "an intention
to commit the underlying offense" and must commit "an overt act toward
its commission.""' The "overt act" must bring the defendant close
enough to the intended crime site to risk violent confrontation." 9
The First Circuit cited to Commonwealth v. Ortiz' to support its
assertion that attempted burglary was a "violent felony." In that case, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a defendant who had
placed a loaded firearm in the front seat of an automobile and gone in
search of an enemy could not be convicted of attempted assault and battery
with a dangerous weapon. 2' The Payne court reasoned that according to
Ortiz, a defendant who obtains burglary tools and sets out for the intended
burglary site would not engage in "overt acts" sufficient to constitute
attempted breaking and entering. 2 The court further inferred from Ortiz
114. 65 N.E. 989 (N.Y. 1903).
115. Id. In Sullivan, the defendant and an accomplice agreed to commit a burglary on a specified
evening. When they arrived at the intended burglary site, they discovered that the tools they had brought
with them were inappropriate to carry out the break-in. They subsequently left to visit a blacksmith shop
and obtain a crowbar. Before they were able to secure a crowbar, however, they were arrested. Id. at
992.
116. 966 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1992).
117. Id. at 9.
118. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 560 N.E.2d 698 (Mass. 1990)).
119. Id. See also United States v. Lane, 909 F.2d 895, 903 (6th Cir. 1990) (examining Ohio
burglary and attempt law and concluding that defendant's prior attempted burglary conviction
constituted a "violent felony" under the ACCA).
120. 560 N.E.2d 698 (Mass. 1990).
121. Payne, 966 F.2d at 9 (citing Ortiz, 560 N.E.2d 698).
122. Id.
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that, when attempted breaking and entering is at issue, an "overt act" would
have to involve conduct such as "coming onto the premises and being
scared off or trying and being unable to break the lock."'
23
The Payne court's comparison of attempted assault and battery with
attempted burglary is unconvincing. Ortiz only suggests that a defendant
should not be convicted of attempted breaking and entering for driving near
the intended burglary site with the proper tools. Ortiz does not foreclose the
possibility that a defendant could be convicted of attempted breaking and
entering when the defendant is on or near the premises, but did not engage
in conduct that posed a serious potential risk to others., 24 Thus, Payne
provides another example of how a defendant may receive an enhanced
sentence based on prior offenses that were not truly "violent felonies."'
2
B. Courts holding that attempted burglary is not a "violent felony"
under the ACCA
1. Attempted burglary is not a "violent felony" in states that broadly
define the offense to include acts that may not involve a risk of
violent confrontation.
The Tenth and Fifth Circuits have concluded that attempted burglary is
never a "violent felony" under the ACCA because, according to the law of
the state in which the defendant was convicted, it is possible that a
predicate offense may not have involved the requisite risk-creating
123. 966 F.2d at 9.
124. Payne fails to acknowledge that a defendant who comes onto the premises, and is for whatever
reason scared off, does not pose the same risk of injury to others as a defendant who is scared off by
a person who appears on the scene and interrupts a would-be burglar while a break-in is occurring. A
would-be burglar could be scared off the premises for a number of reasons, never coming in contact
with another person. For example, a would-be burglar could be on the premises, lurking in the bushes
with burglary tools, and be scared offwhen he or she realizes that the intended burglary site is protected
by a watchdog or a security system.
125. In United States v. Soloman, the Eighth Circuit adopted an approach very similar to the First
Circuit's approach in Payne. 998 F.2d 587, 590 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 639 (1993). In
Soloman, the Eighth Circuit held that attempted burglary, as defined by Minnesota law, is a "violent
felony" under the ACCA. Id. The court looked to Minnesota case law to define conduct that creates a
serious potential risk of physical injury to others. Id. at 590. However, the relevant case, State v.
Geshick, merely held that "preparation, without an overt act or an attempt to commit the intended crime,
is not enough to sustain i conviction for attempt." Id. (citing State v. Geshick, 168 N.W,2d 331 (Minn.
1969)). As the Seventh Circuit has indicated, United States v. Davis, 16 F.3d 212 (7th Cir. 1994), such
language, by itself, is of little significance. See supra notes 104-11.
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conduct. 2 6 Under this approach, these courts recognize that not every
attempted burglary creates the same risk of injury as burglary. Consequent-
ly, in states where the attempt statutes or attempted burglary case law
requires only a minimal level of risk to convict a defendant of attempted
burglary, these circuits will not count any attempted burglaries towards
sentence enhancement. Thus, unlike most other circuits, a defendant who
attempts to physically enter a building or structure will not receive an
enhanced sentence.
In United States v. Strahl,127 the Tenth Circuit determined that, under
Utah's "substantial step" attempt statute, 2S a defendant could be convict-
ed of attempted burglary for engaging in relatively non-risk-creating
conduct such as possessing burglary tools or casing the potential burglary
site.129 The court reasoned that attempt convictions based upon conduct
falling significantly short of a completed offense, do not properly fall
within the ambit of the otherwise clause because, unlike a completed or
nearly completed burglary, such offenses would not pose a risk of violent
confrontation.t3 '
The Tenth Circuit addressed this issue again four months later in United
States v. Permenter31 In Permenter, the Tenth Circuit found that the
defendant's prior attempted burglary conviction was not an "otherwise"
offense. Relying on an approach similar to that employed in Strahl, the
Tenth Circuit determined, without the aid of any case law, that under
Oklahoma's broad attempt statute, a defendant could be convicted for non-
risky conduct such as casing a potential burglary site.t32 Unlike Strahl,
however, in Permenter, the charging papers clearly stated that the defendant
126. United States v. Permenter, 969 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d
980 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Martinez, 954 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1992).
127. 958 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992).
128. The Utah attempt statute is similar to the MPC provision. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-
101 (1995) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(C) (1985).
129. 958 F.2d at 986. The court stated that under Utah law, attempted burglary convictions may
"include conduct well outside § 924(e)'s target of 'violent' felonies." Id. Such conduct may include
"making a duplicate key, 'casing' the targeted building, obtaining floor plans of a structure, or
possessing burglary tools." Id. However, the Tenth Circuit failed to present any state attempt case law
to support its assertion.
130. Id.
131. 969 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1992).
132. The Oklahoma attempt statute provides: "Every person who attempts to commit any crime,
and in such attempt does any act toward the commission of such crime, but fails, or is prevented or
intercepted in the perpetration thereof, is punishable . I... d. at 913 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 42
(1991)). Similar to the rationale espoused in Strahl, the court stated that "[b]ecause 'any act' may count,
a defendant may be found guilty of attempted burglary for merely 'casing' the targeted structure." Id.
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had been arrested while prying open the back door of a building.'33 The
court examined the elements of Oklahoma's attempt statute, noting that
Taylor's requirement of "unlawful or unprivileged entry" was not met on
the statute's face.'34 Adhering to Taylor's categorical approach, the court
reasoned that the conviction did not unequivocally meet the elements of
generic burglary because the charging papers or jury instructions did not
allege actual entry into a building.'35
Similarly, in United States v. Martinez,'36 the Fifth Circuit held that
attempted burglaries in Texas do not constitute violent felonies for purposes
of the otherwise clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).' 37 The court gave two
reasons for its holding. First, the court stated that if Congress meant to
include attempted burglary under § 924(e), it would have done so
expressly. 3 Second, the court rejected the assertion that attempted
burglary presents the same risk of violent confrontation as burglary under
Texas law. 39 Unlike the Tenth Circuit in Martinez, the Fifth Circuit
reached its conclusion by examining the relevant Texas attempted burglary
133. Permenter, 969 F.2d at 913. In Permenter, the defendant's information charged:
The crime of attempted burglary in the second degree was feloniously committed ... by
Charles Martin Permenter who willfully and knowingly attempted to break and enter a
building, known as Dice's Mobile Homes ... by prying open rear door ... but was
prevented from completing the act by arriving of police officers ....
Id. at 913 n.l.
134. Id. at 913.
135. Id. The court adopted a strict reading of Taylor and refused to recognize that a potential for
violent confrontation exists when a defendant is outside a building trying to break in. Id.
136. 954 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1992).
137. Id. at 1053.
138. Id. The court noted that "if Congress believed that the attempt should be treated the same way
as the crime itself, it could have said so with virtually no effort." Id. In fact, the Fifth Circuit held that
attempted burglary was a "crime of violence" under a different sentencing statute where Congress
expressly enumerated attempt crimes as predicate offenses in the text of the statute. In United States
v. Guerra, 962 F.2d 484, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1992), the court held that attempted burglary was a "crime
of violence" for purposes of the USSG where "burglary of a dwelling" was an enumerated predicate
offense in § 4B1.2 of the USSG and Application Note one to § 4B1.2 stated that the term "crime of
violence" includes attempts to commit the offenses enumerated in the USSO. See also United States
v. Jackson, 986 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1993) (counting prior attempted burglary conviction for sentencing
purposes); Dino Privitera, Recent Decision, CriminalLaw-Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Expanding
the Definition of Crime of Violence Under the Career Offender Provision-United States v. John, 936
F.2d (3d Cir. 1991), 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1001 (1992) (criticizing overly expansive interpretations that
count prior attempted burglary convictions such as that in United States v. John, 936 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.
1991)).
139. Id. at 1054. The court stated that "while some attempted burglary does indeed present some
risk of potential harm, that risk simply does not rise to the same level of risk presented by burglary."
Id.
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case law, which stated that a defendant may be convicted of attempted
burglary even if there is no entry into a building or habitation. 4'
2. Attempted burglary is not a "violent felony" if the state statute
permits convictions for non-risky conduct and the charging
instruments or plea agreements indicate that the defendant's conduct
did not pose a risk of violent confrontation.
In United States v. Weekley,"' the Ninth Circuit recognized that, like
Utah and Texas, Washington allows a defendant to be convicted of
attempted burglary for "substantial step" conduct that poses little risk of
physical harm to others."4 2 Moreover, the court proved this assertion by
citing to Washington state attempted burglary case law. 43 However, the
Weekley court did something the Fifth and Tenth Circuits did not: it
conceded that conduct involving something less than actual entry into a
building could still create the possible risk of physical injury to another
person.'" The court applied Taylor's categorical approach, holding that
because nothing in the charging instruments or plea agreement indicated
that the defendant's conduct entailed entry or near entry into a building, his
prior attempted burglary conviction could not be used for sentence
enhancement under § 924(e). 45
IV. PROPOSAL
Sentencing courts must adopt a more uniform approach when considering
the question of whether attempted burglary is a violent felony for purposes
of sentence enhancement under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) of the ACCA. Unless
Congress clarifies exactly what crimes it meant to include in the catchall
140. The court cited Molenda v. State, 715 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), to support
the proposition that "any act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect a
burglary constitutes attempted burglary." Martinez, 954 F.2d at 1053.
141. 24 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 1992).
142. Id. at 1127.
143. To support its propositions, the Weekley court cited Washington v. Vermillion, 832 P.2d 95,
101 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that "substantial step" shown by casing neighborhood, selecting
house to burgle, and possessing neckties to be used in burglary) and State v. Henderson, 792 P.2d 514
(Wash. 1990) (finding that "substantial step" does not require violation of property or entry onto
curtilage).
144. 24 F.3d at 1127. The court held: "An attempt conviction would involve risky conduct where
the statute requires, or the charging instruments and jury instructions show that the jury had to find, an
entry or near entry into a building. But an attempt conviction based on casing a home or merely
possessing burglary tools would not." Id. (emphasis added).
145. Id.
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provision of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Supreme Court must act to ensure that
this complex issue receives uniform treatment.
As a starting point, courts need to agree on how close to completing the
burglary a defendant must come in order to consider the prior offense one
that involved a serious potential risk of physical injury to others.'46 This
Note adopts the reasoning of the majority of circuits that have addressed
the attempted burglary question: An attempted burglary that comes within
dangerous proximity of completion-i.e., involves an actual physical
attempt to enter a building or structure-poses virtually the same inherent
risk of physical harm to others as generic burglary. 47 If courts can agree
146. Most courts agree that the risk involved when an innocent homeowner or bystander interrupts
a burglar trying to illegally enter a premises is almost or equally as great as the risk involved when a
burglar is discovered inside the home.
147. This author realizes that given the current political climate with respect to crime control,
arguing that a nearly completed burglary does not pose the same potential risk of violent confrontation
as burglary would be an exercise in futility. However, there is some question as to whether an attempted
burglary that does not involve an actual physical entry into a structure would encompass conduct risky
enough to justify enhancing a convicted felon's sentence by fifteen years. Compare the following
hypothetical scenarios and consider whether, on a practical level, the potential risk of harm they pose
to others is similar:.
1) A husband and wife return home late one evening. They arrive to find their front door
open and visibly damaged. The couple enters the home, unaware of the intruder they have
interrupted. Curious to see whether their belongings are intact, the couple proceeds upstairs
to examine the second floor. Unbeknownst to them, the intruder is still lurking in their second
floor bedroom contemplating her escape. To escape this situation, the burglar must either exit
the home through a second story window or physically move past the couple, who is either
in the doorway of the bedroom or still in the cramped stairwell. If the burglar is to avoid
apprehension, she will probably physically confront the couple.
2) A husband and wife are away from their home late one evening. Meanwhile, a potential
burglar is attempting to pry open the side door of the couple's house with a crowbar. A
neighbor happens to glance out of his window and see what he believes to be a burglar trying
to enter his neighbor's home. Instead of calling the police, he decides to confront the burglar
face to face. He walks towards his neighbor's side door and yells in his best ex-Marine voice,
"whattaya think you're doin' over there, punk?" Because the would-be burglar is not confined
to the inside of the home, she need only to flee in one of several possible directions to avoid
apprehension.
According to the Supreme Court, the risk of injury associated with burglary arises from the
possibility that the burglar will be interrupted during the act, and resort to violence to escape capture
or carry out his/her plans. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588. Consequently, an "othenvise" offense must involve
a "serious potential risk" that an attempted burglar will use violence to complete the offense or escape
capture. However, statistics demonstrate that burglars prefer to commit their crimes in the daytime to
reduce the risk of violent confrontations. David B. Kopel, Peril or Protection? The Risks and Benefits
of Handgun Prohibition, 12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 285, 346 (1993) (citing PAT MAYHw,
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY: A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND ENGLAND AND
WALES (1987) (citing 1982 British Crime Survey)). Moreover, roughly only 13% of residential
burglaries in the United States are attempted against occupied homes. Id. If the weather forecast called
for a 13% chance of rain, would you consider that a "serious potential risk" of rain?
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that specific elements of attempted burglary exist that, if present, pose an
inherent potential risk of violent confrontation, they will be able to
categorically analyze all attempted burglary offenses.'48
To ensure that district courts can effectively analyze attempted burglary
under the otherwise clause in a uniform and categorical manner, the
Supreme Court should adopt a generic attempted burglary definition that
corresponds with the "generic burglary" definition it adopted in United
States v. Taylor.'49 The Court's generic burglary definition states the
basic elements of "an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in,
a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime."' 0 Similarly,
the generic attempted burglary definition should state:
A person is guilty of attempted burglary if he or she unlawfully or without
privilege, enters a building or structure, or uses physical force to attempt to
enter a building or structure, or remains in or attempts to remain in, a
building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.
The preceding definition requires that the defendant actually attempt to
enter a building using some form of physical exertion.' If the
defendant's attempted burglary does not contain this element, the prior
offense should not be used for purposes of sentence enhancement.
Moreover, if the burglary site is something other than a building or
structure, then the prior attempt should be similarly excluded. 5
In most instances, the state will have to prove that the prior offense
148. District courts should adhere to the categorical approach because appellate courts uniformly
recognize that "the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach are daunting."
United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). Furthermore, a court should not examine state
attempt case law to determine whether a defendant's prior offense necessarily involved the elements of
generic attempted burglary because such an approach is unfair and inaccurate. Very few courts can
accurately determine whether a prior offense involved a physical or near entry into a building by merely
looking to state attempt case law. For a discussion of cases applying state attempt law, see supra notes
104-25 and accompanying text.
149. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
150. Id. at 598.
151. The term "physical force" would include any physical exertion upon a structure with the
purpose of gaining entry. Such exertion would include conduct ranging from simply shaking a doorknob
to smashing a window or prying a door open with a crowbar.
152. The Supreme Court left unresolved the question of how a sentencing court should approach
a situation where the prior burglary or attempted burglary did not occur in a building or structure (i.e.,
a car, booth, vending machine, or boat). Taylor left open the possibility that when an attempted or
completed burglary involves something other than a "building or structure," a court may examine the
facts and circumstances surrounding the prior offense to determine whether it involved conduct that
posed a serious risk of injury to others. For a discussion of Taylor's categorical approach, see supra
note 75 and accompanying text.
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contained the elements of generic attempted burglary by looking to the
charging papers, jury instructions, or other available documents.'53 The
only way district courts can prove, with the utmost certainty, that the
predicate offense satisfies all the elements of generic attempted burglary,
is with the Supreme Court's explicit permission to use every available
reliable means 54 to categorically make this showing. Most lower courts
have already interpreted Taylor as allowing sentencing courts to examine
a wide variety of court documents, including trial transcripts and pre-
sentence reports, to prove the elements of a prior offense.'55 Therefore,
the Supreme Court should adopt the majority position and clarify its
holding to explain that when a sentencing court determines whether a prior
153. Because states do not have the equivalent of a generic attempted burglary statute, most courts
would have to examine available documents to determine whether the prior offense met all of the
elements of generic attempted burglary. However, this method will ensure that the sentencing court is
absolutely certain that every attempted burglary employed as a predicate offense for a mandatory
minimum fifteen year sentence enhancement actually involved conduct presenting a serious potential
risk of injury to another.
154. The Supreme Court explicitly approved of this practice in Taylor. See supra notes 79-81 and
accompanying text. Although Taylor explicitly allows courts to look only at charging papers and jury
instructions, many courts have ruled that the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor does not restrict the
court to only those documents. See infra note 155 and accompanying text. This Note argues that given
the Supreme Court's persuasive arguments against "ad hoc mini-trials," courts must adhere to the
categorical approach. However, the nature of attempted burglary makes it such that determining actual
physical entry or near entry into a building is not apparent from the mere fact of conviction. Therefore,
the prosecution must have a reliable recourse to show that the jury actually had to find these elements
to convict.
155. Whether the parties are limited to use of the indictment or information and jury instructions,
or whether the Supreme Court merely listed them as examples of permissible proof has also been a
source of controversy among lower courts. In fact, when Taylor was remanded, the district court
allowed the government to introduce "the transcript record of the guilty plea" to show that the
defendant's prior burglary offense met the Supreme Court's generic definition. United States v. Taylor,
932 F.2d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1991). In United States v. Harris, the First Circuit's then Chief Judge
Breyer decided that Taylor illustrated one way a trial court might decide which of the prior convictions
involved offenses constituting violent felonies. 964 F.2d 1234, 1236 (Ist Cir. 1992). Judge Breyer noted
that another way to make this determination was by reading the presentence report. Id. See also United
States v. Bregnard, 951 F.2d 457, 458 (1st Cir. 1991) (allowing use of pre-sentence report); United
States v. Sweeten, 933 F.2d 765, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that court may use 'judicially
noticeable facts" clearly establishing that a conviction meets statutory requirements for enhancement
purposes); United States v. Hardy, 829 F. Supp. 478, 493 (D. Mass. 1993) (allowing court to use the
state probation officer's court notes, the sentence imposed for a prior crime, an order of restitution, and
information in an application for complaint); United States v. Hines, 802 F. Supp. 559, 569 (D. Mass.
1992) (holding that court may use other supporting documents such as police records, state pre-sentence
reports, and/or official descriptions of the criminal conduct); but see United States v. Payton, 918 F.2d
54, 56 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2143 (1991) (holding that pursuant to Taylor, district
court erred in looking beyond the statute, charging paper, and jury instructions, to the police report in
order to determine whether defendant's prior conviction constituted a violent felony).
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offense includes all the elements of generic attempted burglary, it is not
limited to "the indictment or information and jury instructions."'56
Finally, if the prosecution is unable to prove the necessary elements of
the predicate offense through appropriate court documents, the rule of
lenity' prohibits a sentencing court from using the prior attempted
burglary conviction to enhance the sentence. It is imperative that courts
apply the rule of lenity to ensure that they do not base a mandatory
minimum fifteen year sentence enhancement on predicate offenses that do
not constitute "violent felonies" under the ACCA.
V. CONCLUSION
After the Supreme Court decided Taylor v. United States, the question
of whether the crime of attempted burglary is a "violent felony" under the
ACCA has become a source of confusion and controversy among federal
courts. Some circuits enhance a defendant's sentence where the prior
attempted burglaries failed to involve conduct posing a serious risk of
physical harm to others, such as casing an intended burglary site. Moreover,
some circuits refuse to enhance a defendant's sentence even though the
defendant clearly engaged in prior risk-creating attempted burglaries, such
as breaking a window to enter a home. Thus, courts are imposing divergent
sentences upon defendants committing exactly the same crimes. To rectify
this situation, the Supreme Court should adopt a generic attempted burglary
definition that encompasses only those elements of attempted burglary that
pose a serious potential risk of harm to others. Thus, courts would be able
to categorically examine prior attempted burglaries by looking to court
records such as charging papers, jury instructions, or trial transcripts and
determine whether the prior offense encompassed the requisite elements. In
the absence of a uniform treatment of this issue, the ACCA will continue
to be an ineffective and unjust federal sentencing statute.
Douglas A. Passon
156. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
157. For an explanation of the rule of lenity, see supra note 51.
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